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Patient Expectations and Access to Prescription 
Medication Are Threatened by Pharmacist 
Conscience Clauses  
Kelsey C. Brodsho* 
INTRODUCTION 
Current debate regarding the pharmacist’s role in 
dispensing emergency contraception threatens to overshadow a 
larger issue: the pharmacist’s role in health care delivery.  The 
value of prescription drugs in today’s health care market 
cannot be denied.  Likewise, the pharmacist’s role in delivering 
health care services must not be undervalued.  However, the 
primary relationship within the health care system remains 
between the patient and the physician.  This article asserts 
that professional responsibilities of physicians and pharmacists 
are distinct.  This distinction requires that pharmacist 
conscience clauses be tailored to meet the objective of the 
health care system.  The article argues that conscience clause 
legislation must ultimately ensure patients access to the entire 
spectrum of health care services.  Conscience clause legislation 
that does not meet this end is contrary to the tenets of the 
medical profession and fails to meet patient expectations. 
Conscience clauses, also known as refusal clauses, were 
first enacted in response to Roe v. Wade,1 which legalized 
abortion.  These laws originally allowed doctors to “refuse to 
perform or assist in an abortion.”2  Today, providers rely on 
                                                          
       ©     2005 Kelsey C. Brodsho. 
        *     J.D. expected 2007, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. See Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saying Roe Is Not 
Enough:  When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 746 
(2004). 
 2. Adam Sonfield, New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between 
Provider ‘Conscience,’ Patient Needs, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC 
POLICY, Aug. 2004, at 1; cf. National Abortion Fed’n, Nationwide Trends:  
Refusal to Provide Services (May 27, 2005),  
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/yourstate/whodecides/trends/issues_medical_
BRODSHO_FINAL_125.DOC 01/09/2006  12:35:53 PM 
328 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:1 
 
conscience objections to remove themselves from other health 
care processes or decisions.3  A few states allow providers to opt 
out of assisted suicide4 or any other morally or ethically 
objectionable situation.5  The availability of new technologies 
will likely create situations that many individuals find 
objectionable on moral grounds.  For this reason, the current 
debate over pharmacist conscience clauses has ramifications far 
beyond access to the “morning-after pill.”6  Many states are 
introducing legislation that seeks to insulate pharmacists from 
a duty to fill prescriptions and/or legislation that requires 
pharmacists to fill all prescriptions (or assure the prescription 
will be filled by another pharmacist).7  In considering these 
legislative measures, state legislators must not get lost in 
abortion politics.  Emotionally driven legislation may later 
threaten access to a wide variety of health care services. 
THE PHYSICIAN’S ROLE VS. THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE 
Physicians prescribe medication.  Pharmacists dispense 
medication.  The physician initiates a treatment plan.  The 
pharmacist implements aspects of a treatment plan.  Because 
the roles of the physician and the pharmacist are different, a 
                                                          
services.cfm (stating that forty-seven states currently have laws that allow 
health care providers to refuse participation in abortion services). 
 3. See Fogel & Rivera, supra note 1, at 746 (discussing refusal clauses for 
individual and health care institutions); Sonfield, supra note 2, at 1 
(identifying in vitro fertilization, human embryo research, stem cell research, 
and end-of-life practices such as assisted suicide and adherence to living wills 
as potentially objectionable areas of health care delivery). 
 4. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (1998). 
 5. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(5) (1999). 
 6. See generally AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N, EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION:  THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE (2000).  Recent FDA approval of 
oral hormonal emergency contraception has drawn public attention to the use 
of post-coital contraceptives.  Emergency contraception, commonly referred to 
as the “morning-after pill,” can effectively prevent pregnancy up to seventy-
two hours following intercourse.  Despite politically driven propaganda 
suggesting otherwise, emergency contraception utilizes the same mechanisms 
as daily estrogen/progestin oral contraceptives to prevent pregnancy.  
Specifically, both forms of contraception inhibit any of the following processes: 
ovulation, fertilization, transport of a fertilized egg to the uterus, or 
implantation of a blastocyst in the endometrium.  Emergency contraception 
differs from other hormonal contraceptives only in dose.  Emergency 
contraception, like all oral contraceptives, act before implantation, and are 
therefore not considered abortificients.  Id. 
 7. Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, 
March 28, 2005, at A1. 
BRODSHO_FINAL_125.DOC 01/09/2006  12:35:53 PM 
2005] PATIENT EXPECTATIONS  329 
 
physician’s ability to conscientiously object to providing certain 
health services is not automatically imputed to the pharmacist.  
The physician has greater authority to refuse participation in 
the development of a treatment plan than a pharmacist has to 
interfere with an established treatment plan, because patient 
expectations of treatment plan effectuation increase after the 
plan is developed within the patient-physician relationship. 
The physician and the patient have a central patient-
provider relationship.  Within the context of that relationship, 
the physician and the patient create medical plans to further 
the patient’s best interests.  This treatment plan is a creation of 
the patient-physician relationship.  It would not exist but for 
the involvement of these individuals.  The pharmacist is one of 
many health professionals who may be called upon to help 
effectuate an established treatment plan.  After a physician 
prescribes medication, the patient consults a pharmacist to 
dispense the prescription.  The pharmacist is a link in a chain 
that effectuates the treatment plan developed within the 
patient-physician relationship.  Therefore, if the pharmacist 
refuses to dispense medication, he or she is necessarily 
interfering with a treatment plan that has previously been 
established between a willing provider and a consensual 
patient. 
As the link between provider and patient, the pharmacist’s 
duty to effectuate treatment cannot be characterized in the 
same way as a physician’s duty to initiate treatment.  The 
patient’s expectations provide the basis for this crucial 
distinction.  A patient who initiates a legal course of medical 
intervention with a physician does not expect that treatment 
plan to be thwarted by other health professionals.8  A 
pharmacist’s interference with an established treatment plan 
may compromise the patient’s ability to obtain services that 
further his or her best interests.9 
                                                          
 8. See generally Fogel & Rivera, supra note 1 (discussing patient 
expectations). 
 9. See Illinois Governor Issues Emergency Rule Ensuring Contraceptive 
Access, LAW AND HEALTH WEEKLY, May 7, 2005, at 331 [hereinafter Illinois 
Governor Issues Emergency Rule].  Steve Trombley, president and CEO of 
Planned Parenthood/Chicago Area, recently framed the issue in this way:   
When medical professionals write prescriptions for their patient, they 
are acting in their patient’s best interests, a pharmacist’s personal 
views cannot intrude on the relationship between a woman and her 
doctor.  A pharmacist must dispense prescriptions issued by health 
care providers otherwise the patient’s health is unnecessarily put at 
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One can also argue that allowing physicians to 
conscientiously object to providing medical services decreases 
patient access.  This is true.  However, physician refusal must 
be evaluated differently.  This evaluation must be based on 
different patient expectations.  The provider generally refuses 
services before a treatment plan has been developed.  Thus, the 
patient does not expect a treatment plan to be effectuated.  
Further discussion regarding extent of physician refusals and 
the impact on patient access is beyond the scope of this article. 
CONSCIENCE OBJECTION 
Health professionals other than physicians have recently 
claimed the right to refuse services based on moral objections.  
In particular, pharmacists have asserted the right to refuse 
dispensing medications, such as contraceptives.10  Several 
professional organizations have issued policy statements 
regarding pharmacists’ conscientious objections.  The American 
Pharmacists Association (APhA) first announced its policy 
regarding conscience clauses in 1998 following the enactment of 
Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law.11  The APhA’s policy 
recognizes a pharmacist’s individual right to “step away from 
participating in activity to which they have personal 
objections.”12  However, the APhA policy statement 
simultaneously supports establishing systems to ensure that 
the patient’s health care needs are served.13  Thus, the APhA 
recognizes that a pharmacist’s objection should not interfere 
with an established treatment plan.  Likewise, the American 
Medical Association supports legislation requiring individual 
pharmacists or pharmacy chains to fill legally valid 
prescriptions or to provide immediate referral to an appropriate 
alternative dispensing pharmacy without interference. 14 
These policy statements represent the collective opinion of 
health care professionals and have a common denominator. 
Each stresses the need for seamless effectuation of an 
                                                          
risk.   
Id. 
 10. See Stein, supra note 7. 
 11. Bob Reynolds, AMA Rules on Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 
PHARMACIST.COM, June 27, 2005, 
http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/h_ts_0835.cfm. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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established treatment plan.  If a pharmacist morally objects to 
care delivery, the medical community believes that this refusal 
must not obstruct a patient’s access to care.15  “No health care 
professional should be exempt from providing complete and 
accurate medical information, from making appropriate 
referrals, or from providing urgent care.”16 
If a pharmacist is unable to transfer a prescription to 
another pharmacist or pharmacy (for example, due to staffing 
or geographic limitations), the needs of the patient must trump 
the pharmacist’s moral objection.17  As demonstrated by a 
recent Wisconsin case, the pharmacy community believes 
conscience objections should not interfere with access to care.  
In 2002, Neil Noesen, a Wisconsin pharmacist, refused to fill an 
oral contraceptive prescription.  Due to his refusal, the patient 
waited two days to receive her prescription.  Before this 
incident, Mr. Noesen had informed his employer he was 
generally unwilling to fill contraceptive prescriptions.  
However, he did not alert his employer that he was also 
unwilling to transfer contraceptive prescriptions to another 
pharmacist.  A Wisconsin administrative judge found that 
accepted professional standards require a pharmacist who 
conscientiously objects to delivering health care services to 
transfer the prescription to another pharmacist.  Because Mr. 
Noesen failed to transfer the prescription or tell the patient to 
fill the prescription filled elsewhere, he violated professional 
standards.  The Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board found 
Mr. Noesen to have “engaged in practice which constitutes a 
danger to the health, welfare, or safety of a patient and has 
practiced in a manner which substantially departs from the 
standard of care ordinarily exercised by a pharmacist and 
                                                          
 15. See American Medical Association, Conscience Clause: Final Report 
(H-295.896), http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-
295.896.HTM (last visited September 24, 2005). 
 16. See generally Fogel & Rivera, supra note 1, at 726-27 (discussing 
patient expectations).  Fogel and Rivera offer several cases to support this 
proposition, including Brownfield v. Daniel, 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that absent a statutory refusal clause an emergency room must 
provide emergency contraception to a rape victim because the patient 
maintains a common law right to self-determination) and Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, 656 P. 2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a refusal clause allowing 
physicians to opt out of performing abortions did not exempt physicians from 
providing genetic counseling that included the option of abortion).  Fogel & 
Rivera, supra note 1, at 736-39. 
 17. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 1, at 726-27.  
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which harmed or could have harmed a patient.”18 
State law that allows conscience objection if a transfer can 
be made reflects professional standards and general medical 
principles of serving patients’ best interests.  Each pharmacist 
embarked on his or her career path to serve the health needs of 
patients by effectuating treatment plans.  If a pharmacist is 
unwilling to meet the needs of a particular patient and he or 
she does not transfer the patient to a pharmacist who is willing 
to meet these needs, the pharmacist in effect thwarts the goals 
of the medical community. 
STATE LEGISLATION: TWO SIDES OF THE COIN 
Most states have not yet enacted pharmacist conscience 
clauses.  However, recent media attention regarding emergency 
contraception has fueled public debate regarding the role of the 
pharmacist.19  Increased public awareness creates increased 
state action; thus, many state legislatures have taken up the 
issue of pharmacist conscience clauses.  It should be noted that 
in the absence of an explicit conscience objection clause, state 
law does not presume that a pharmacist may refuse services for 
moral reasons.  Dispensing statutes and administrative 
regulations generally do not include moral objection as a legal 
reason justifying a pharmacist’s refusal to fill valid 
prescriptions.20  Because moral objections are not included in 
enumerated refusal lists, statutory construction implies that 
moral objection is not an authorized reason to refuse services.  
However, patient experiences demonstrate that pharmacists do 
invoke conscience objections.21  Many objections are made in 
the absence of statutory authority. 
Only four states explicitly allow pharmacists to refuse 
dispensing particular medications.  These state laws 
demonstrate the scope of potential conscience clause 
legislation.  In Arkansas and Georgia, conscience objection 
exemptions are narrow.  Arkansas allows medical professionals 
                                                          
 18. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Neil T. Noesen, No. 
LS0310091PHM (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. April 13, 2005), available at  
http://drl.wi.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm. 
 19. See Stein, supra note 7. 
 20. See Fogel & Rivera, supra note 1 (arguing that conscience objections 
do not appear in lists of enumerated rights to refuse, such as in the case of 
known drug interactions when a pharmacist has a duty not to harm the 
patient by filling a contraindicated prescription). 
 21. See Stein, supra note 7. 
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to refuse to perform abortion services and provide or dispense 
contraceptives in all or most circumstances.22  Pharmacists in 
Georgia are not required to fill prescriptions for emergency 
contraceptives.23  South Dakota legislation encompasses 
several different types of objections.  South Dakota allows 
pharmacists to refuse services used to “[c]ause an abortion; or 
[d]estroy an unborn child . . . or; [c]ause the death of any person 
by means of an assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.”24  
This statutory language could result in a political debate that 
ultimately loses sight of a patient’s access to health services. 
A recently enacted Mississippi law demonstrates that 
pharmacists can be granted wide discretion under conscience 
clause legislation.  Mississippi adopted a conscience clause that 
allows “a health-care provider [to] decline to comply with an 
individual instruction or health-care decision for reasons of 
conscience.”25  This legislation removes the conscience clause 
from the abortion context.  Furthermore, it equates a 
physician’s refusal with that of all other health care providers, 
including pharmacists.  Without assurance that a patient is 
referred to a professional who will meet his or her health care 
needs, this law compromises ultimate objectives of the health 
care delivery system.  Mississippi’s conscience clause signals an 
alarming trend.  Thirteen states introduced legislation in 2005 
that would allow pharmacists to refuse to provide services.26  
Several of these proposed measures are similar to the 
Mississippi law, and many neglect to provide adequate 
assurance that patients will receive timely access to health care 
services.27 
                                                          
 22. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (1973) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall 
prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or any other authorized paramedical 
personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or 
information.”). 
 23. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 480-5-.03(n) (2001) (“It shall not be considered 
unprofessional conduct for any pharmacist to refuse to fill any prescription 
based on his/her professional judgment or ethical or moral beliefs.”). 
 24. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (1998).  Note that under currently 
accepted medical definitions, daily contraceptives and emergency 
contraception would not fall under the conscience objection exemption. 
 25. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(5) (1999). 
 26. See National Council of State Legislatures, Pharmacist Conscience 
Clauses: Laws and Legislation (June 2005), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/ConscienceClauses.htm (last visited Oct. 
10, 2005). 
 27. See, e.g., H.B. 5085, 2005 Gen Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005) (“A health 
care provider has the right not to participate, and no health care provider 
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Not all 2005 state action supported the proliferation of 
pharmacist conscience clauses.  Three states explicitly stated 
pharmacists must fill valid prescriptions.  In April 2005, 
Illinois’s governor issued an emergency rule to ensure that 
pharmacies fill prescriptions without delay.28  Pharmacy boards 
in Massachusetts and North Carolina stated that pharmacists 
who impede patients’ access to prescription medication will be 
disciplined.29  Several other states also introduced legislation 
that would require pharmacists to fill prescriptions.30 
REALITY STRIKES 
The medical community agrees that while health 
professionals may be given statutory rights to refuse health 
services for moral reasons, refusal cannot prevent patients 
from receiving “the information, services, and dignity to which 
they are entitled.”31  In theory, laws and institutional policies 
                                                          
shall be required to participate, in a health care service that violates his or her 
conscience.”); H.B. 1255, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005) ( “Any health care 
provider has the right not to participate, and no health care provider shall be 
required to participate, in a health care service that violates the provider’s 
conscience.”); S.B. 76, H.B. 1383, 104th Gen Assem., Reg. Sess.  (Tenn. 2005) 
(authorizing pharmacists and pharmacy owners and operators to decline to fill 
a particular type of prescription on the grounds that filling such prescription 
violates the pharmacist’s or owner/operator’s religious principles, requiring 
written notice of such conscientious objections); H.B. 183, 2005 Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2005) ( “A health care provider has the right not to participate, 
and no health care provider shall be required to participate, in a health care 
service that violates his or her conscience.”); see also National Council of State 
Legislatures, supra note 26 (summarizing 2005 legislation). 
 28. See JILL MORRISON, THE NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, DON’T TAKE 
NO FOR AN ANSWER:  A GUIDE TO PHARMACY REFUSAL LAWS, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES 5 (2005), http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/8-2005_DontTakeNo1.pdf; 
Illinois Governor Issues Emergency Rule, supra note 9. 
 29. See MORRISON, supra note 28, at 5. 
 30. See, e.g., S.B. 644, 2005 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (authorizing a 
pharmacist to decline to dispense a prescription on ethical, moral, or religious 
grounds only if his or her employer is able to reasonably accommodate the 
objection, without creating undue hardship); S.B. 458, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2005) (requiring pharmacists to fill prescriptions against religious 
beliefs unless an employer can accommodate a request not to do so); A.B. 3772, 
S.B. 2178, 211th Legis., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005) (prohibiting pharmacists from 
refusing to dispense medication solely for philosophical, moral, or religious 
reasons); H.B. 2807, 77th Legis., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005) (prohibiting 
pharmacists and other persons involved in dispensing medicines from refusing 
to fill prescriptions); see also National Council of State Legislatures, supra 
note 26 (summarizing 2005 legislation). 
 31. See Adam Sonfield, Rights vs. Responsibilities: Professional Standards 
and Provider Refusals, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Aug. 
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that allow pharmacists to transfer prescriptions to another 
pharmacist do not interfere with established treatment plans.  
However, in practice these laws may delay health care services 
and harm patients.  For example, if a pharmacist objects to 
filling an emergency contraception prescription, the time 
required to transfer the prescription to an alternate pharmacist 
delays administration of the drug and decreases its 
effectiveness.32  Young patients, patients in rural areas, and 
individuals seeking weekend services may be particularly 
vulnerable to denied access.33  In many foreseeable situations, a 
pharmacist’s moral objection may delay or prevent the receipt 
of prescription mediation.  Pharmacists who refuse to provide 
services or transfer prescriptions to colleagues act contrary to 
professional objectives.  Unnecessary delays or obstructions by 
pharmacists jeopardize treatment plans established by 
physicians and patients. 
State legislatures and professional licensing boards have 
vast discretion to authorize the actions of health professionals.  
Health and safety interests guide these policy decisions.  No 
general right to health care exists, but it is well established 
that individuals have a right to access birth control services.34  
Conscience clause legislation that does not assure patient 
access to contraceptive services likely conflicts with 
reproductive liberty interests.  Presuming the 
unconstitutionality of pharmacists’ absolute right to interfere 
with established treatment plans, states legislatures that wish 
to address this issue have two permissible strategies.  First, 
states may require pharmacists to fill all prescriptions.  
Alternately, states may pass conscience clause legislation that 
assures patient access to health care services by prescription 
transfer or other similar procedure.  Either option theoretically 
“solves” the current contraceptive debate, but state legislators 
must realize that this policy decision in effect defines the 
pharmacist’s role in the patient-physician relationship.  It 
likely will guide dispensing regulations for other controversial 
medication in the future.  Conscience clause debate should not 
be clothed in abortion politics.  Rather, its focus should be on 
                                                          
2005, at 7. 
 32. See, e.g., AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N, supra note 6. 
 33. See MORRISON, supra note 28, at 3; Rob Stein, Birth Control? Some 
Druggists Say No, SEATTLE TIMES, March 28, 2005, at A5. 
 34. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441-43 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
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whether a pharmacist has a right to interfere with a treatment 
plan established by a patient and his or her primary health 
care provider. 
 
 
 
